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Abstract — Computing has become part of everyday life by means 
of consumer electronics, embedded systems and other computing 
systems. Security as a new dimension in the design of computing 
systems has increased the complexity of design process. A 
structural secure design methodology would facilitate the design 
process and improve the assurance on security of a system. In this 
paper a structural design process for considering security from 
the beginning is proposed. 
Keywords— security; design process; embedded systems; design 
methodology 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many devices produced today require security. The assets 
on the device must remain confidential, available and protected 
against manipulation according to defined policies. The success 
of businesses, the satisfaction and confidence of users depend 
on the strength of the device security. Making secure a device 
with various assets, different security expectations and multiple 
stakeholders is difficult. Many parameters should be considered 
to design a secure device. For example, consider an embedded 
system, which stores, processes and transmits data of different 
stakeholders, especially current devices with many features and 
naturally various security requirements. Due to the complexity 
of the system, if there is no systematic analysis and design 
method, the assets on the system might be weakly secured or 
not be secured at all. Security breaches are not always by 
breaking cryptographic algorithms or using technical methods. 
Ross Anderson in his survey of the failure modes of secure 
systems titled “why cryptosystems fail” [1] discusses that most 
frauds were not caused by cryptanalysis or other technical 
attacks, but by implementation errors and management failures. 
Clearly, it is important to secure systematically a computing 
system against security breaches. It is unwise to start building a 
house, for example, without first considering a design, which 
provides a secure and safe house, and the requirements the 
house should fulfill. This idea applies to securing computing 
systems too: careful planning ensures the implementation of 
optimal and proper safeguards and controls in a system. 
Therefore one needs to utilize a design method that considers 
security from the beginning and throughout the life cycle of the 
system.   
Secure system design methods have evolved in computer 
security history from checklists and standards to secure design 
methodologies.  The idea of checklists is to identify possible 
countermeasures and to pick out the security solutions, which 
are needed from this list. Security standards such as ISO/IEC 
17799 (subsequently renumbered ISO/IEC 27002) [2], and 
GAISP (Generally Accepted Information Security Principals) 
[3] followed after checklists. A difference between checklists 
and standards is that the standards attempt to establish 
international, authoritative, and generic security criteria. In 
response to the limitations of security checklists and standards, 
security methods appeared. In contrast to standards and 
checklists, these methods begin development by exploring 
systems security requirements. The methodologies can be 
classified into five categories: stepwise; object-oriented; viable; 
information modeling; and responsibility modeling. Some of 
these methods take influence from previous information 
systems (IS) and software development methods.  
Available methods are mostly either for IS in organizations 
or software development. However, nowadays there are many 
computing devices with complicated life cycle and numerous 
features, for example: smart phones, GPS systems, medical 
devices, and so on. To design such devices, the methodologies 
for secure IS in organizations or software design methodologies 
are not the solution; however, they can be adapted. Life cycle of 
assets on electronic devices is more complicated than software 
systems or IS. Also in electronic devices, in some scenarios, 
there are many entities involved throughout the life cycle of the 
system and this makes the security of system more challenging 
than software systems or IS.  
The first step in the design of a secure system is to specify 
the security requirements of the system. Existence of a 
systematic and structural method for specifying the security 
requirements of a system is significantly helpful. It helps to 
have a level of assurance that the essential security 
requirements were not neglected. If this method is structural 
and step by step, it also reduces the complexity of design. 
Security requirement specification is to specify the functional 
and non-functional requirements and policies that a design 
should have in order to be considered secure and the assets on 
the system are protected. A structural design method has many 
advantages that are emphasized here: 
• In most cases, a system is designed then based on the 
realized system the security engineers play the role of an 
adversary and try to have a threat model for the system. 
The output of this threat modeling is a set of security 
requirements. In these cases they may not have a 
systematic and holistic method for the specification of the 
requirements and they are not sure about the completeness 
of the system functionalities. After releasing the product, 
they may find that the system needed some additional 
features and it may be late because there may not be more 
available resources on the system or may lead to a 
fundamental change in the design of the system. However, 
a structural method simplifies the study of the system life 
cycle in order to list its security requirements, and to 
manage and prioritize them and have provisions for all the 
security expectations. For example, a company may 
design a device, which stores data of the user securely 
however the transfer of data from one device to another, in 
case the user bought a new device, might not have been 
foreseen. Later the designers would have difficulty in 
adding this feature to the device because there are limited 
resources on the device for new feature while this could be 
predicted before releasing the device. If there was a 
systematic method and they had a holistic view of the 
system from the beginning throughout the entire life cycle, 
then the designers could manage the resources and 
prioritize the requirements. 
• Considering security sooner in design process means less 
unnecessary costs for the stakeholders. There is a study [4] 
that shows the sooner vulnerabilities are detected the less 
expensive is fixing them. 
• A structural requirement specification and design process 
simplifies the process and they need not to have extensive 
experience in security engineering. A designer with basic 
knowledge of security can follow the steps and reach to a 
set of security requirements for his design. 
• A well developed design method can be automated and 
help the designer to computerize the task of requirement 
specification and other stages of the design. 
• A design method can also be used for analysis and 
evaluation of an off the shelf product. 
• A security requirement method can act as a modeling and 
common language between designers and implementers, 
also as a reference for new designs or modifications. 
• It is also useful as a model for study of future changes and 
their impacts on the entire system. 
Considering all the advantages mentioned above as 
motivation for our work, in this paper a structural security 
design method is proposed.  
In Section II a review of related work is presented. Most of 
the design methods are related to IS and some works are 
proposing specific secure design methods for specific security 
problems. In Section III, the structural security design 
methodology that is main contribution of this paper is described 
in detail. The last section is the conclusion of the paper where 
the findings of paper are summarized. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Earlier review studies [5][6][7] have classified IS design 
methods into five paradigms: security-modified IS design 
methods, responsibility method,  business process methods, 
information modeling methods, and viable and survivable 
system methods. 
1. Security-modified IS design paradigm 
The security-modified IS design paradigm are secure aware 
version of IS or software development methods. This paradigm 
includes methods such as the logical control method [8], the 
spiral model for secure IS design [9], virtual methodology [10] 
[11], the soft method for the planning of secure IS [12], meta-
notation [13], secure IS planning methodology [14] and 
UMLsec [15], security design patterns [16] and integrated 
security and systems engineering approach [17][18]. 
The logical control method adds the required security 
controls into processes. Threat classes and corresponding 
controls are listed in a data dictionary. 
The spiral model for secure IS design integrates security 
concerns into Boehm's spiral model [19]. 
Virtual methodology is modified version of soft systems 
methodology [20], emphasizing organizational, cultural and 
human factors in the development and design of IS design. 
The soft method for planning of secure IS is also based on 
the soft system methodology. This method encourages the role 
of the user contribution in the design and development of 
secure IS to exploit the user's knowledge of the organization 
activities and to increase user's awareness and commitment to 
the designed system. 
Meta-notation like the logical control method and the spiral 
model adapts IS and software development methods. In this 
method six security elements are proposed to be integrated into 
IS and software development methods to make those methods 
secure aware. 
Secure IS planning methodology is composed of three 
components: security risk planning model, awareness program, 
and countermeasure matrix. This method proposes five stages 
for secure IS planning: recognition of security problems; risk 
analysis; generation of alternatives; decision making; 
implementation. The awareness program and countermeasure 
matrix are integrated into these stages. 
UMLsec is security extension of UML by proposing new 
security elements like {tags} and <<stereotypes>> to UML. It 
allows expressing security requirements in a system 
specification. 
Security design patterns address the security in systems 
design using best practice solutions to show how to integrate 
security in the engineering process. This methodology offers a 
pattern catalog, which enables designers to pick security 
patterns, which meet their particular requirements. 
The integrated security and systems engineering approach 
extends Tropos method with security features. Tropos is a 
software development methodology, where concepts of the 
agent paradigm are used along the entire software development 
process [21]. 
2. Responsibility modeling paradigm 
Secure IS design methods in the responsibility modeling 
paradigm assume security requirement of a system can be 
extracted by investigating the job responsibilities in 
organizations. Examples of these methods are abuse-case-based   
[22], eliciting security requirements with misuse cases [23] the 
task-based analysis method for a better authorization model 
[24]. According to [25] security requirements, i.e., need-to-do 
and need-to-know, can be drawn from the job responsibilities. 
3. Business process paradigm 
The business process paradigm consists of methods such as 
providing security semantics in workflow management [26], the 
fair and secure electronic markets model and infrastructure 
[27]. These methods aim to build a modeling notation for 
describing security constraints in business process models. 
4. Information modeling paradigm 
The information modeling paradigm includes methods 
attempt to present security notations particularly for developing 
secure databases. Security constraints during multilevel secure 
database design method [28], object-oriented modeling of 
security semantics [29], modeling data secrecy and integrity 
with data flow diagrams and entity-relationship [30] and OLAP 
(On-Line Analytical Processing) Security Design [31]. 
5. Viable and survivable IS paradigm 
The viable and survivable IS paradigm includes methods 
that resist attacks and are survivable (methods to build systems 
to cope with present and future attacks). [32] is a viable system 
model and [33] a survivable system design method. 
III. STRUCTURAL SECURITY DESIGN METHODOLOGY 
After mentioning the motivation behind a structural security 
design method and listing other design methodology related to 
this paper, in this section the proposed method is explained. 
The foundation of the method is based on this idea that for 
securing a system, the principal is protection of assets in a 
system based on defined policies. Therefore, in securing a 
system 3 phases as it is shown in Figure 1 are followed: 
A. Identifying assets 
B. Defining policies for securing each asset 
C. Enforcing the policies on the assets 
To make an entire system secure, the set of assets on the 
system should be protected. For each asset, these 3 phases 
should be followed. Each phase consists of one or several steps. 
The outline of the Structural Security Design Process is as 
follows: 
A.  Identifying assets 
o Step 1. Identification of resources 
o Step 2. Security properties specification 
o Step 3. The entities involved in the system 
lifecycle 
o Step 4. The life cycle of the system 
B. Defining policies for securing each asset 
o Step 5. Defining policies 
C. Enforcing the policies on the assets 
o Step 6. Security Strategy 
o Step 7. The acquired technology 
o Step 8. Risk Assessment 
Each step is explained in detail in the next subsections. Note 
that when we refer to “designer”, it may imply that a single 
person is responsible for the design process, but in most cases, a 
cross section of the entire corporation (technical and business 
people) forms the team of design. Determining efficient 
composition of the design team and responsibility of each 
member of the team is important but it is out of the scope of 
this paper.  
A. Identifying assets 
Before starting identification of assets in a system, the 
system must have been defined. Features, data, processes, and 
functionalities should have been specified without security 
considerations. Out of this information from the system, a 
designer(s) can identify the assets on the system.  In fact, s/he 
knows what the system is and wants to make it secure. A 
designer just follows the steps to make the specified system 
secure.  
In a system, an asset is a resource, which needs security 
properties and consequently protection. Among the resources, 
some need security and some do not need so. Those which need 
security are identified as assets. These resources are generally 
valuable and sensitive. Security properties means the assets 
need one or multiple of the security properties.  These 
properties can be, for instance, CIA triad (Confidentiality, 
Integrity, and Availability) or Parkerian Hexad (will be 
explained in Step 2), or other properties such as: untraceability, 
anonymity, uncloneability, etc.  
An asset has 4 aspects. First an asset is a resource in a 
system. Second the resource has to require security property to 
be considered asset. A resource without security requirement is 
not considered an asset. Third aspect is that there should be 
some stakeholders and adversary for that asset, otherwise if a 
resource is not valuable and/or accessible to anybody but his 
owner, then it is not considered an asset, which needs 
protection. Forth aspect is the life-cycle of the asset. As it is 
shown in Figure 2, to identify assets in a system and to define 
their security policy, four aspects of the asset (resources, 
security properties, life cycle of the resources, and entities 
involved throughout the life cycle of the resources) should be 
specified. As it is shown in Figure 3, the designer can start from 
listing resources and continue to determining security property 
of the resources, studying the life cycle of the resource and then 
detecting the entities involved in the life cycle of the resource. 
Of course finishing one step does not mean that the step is 
complete and should not be revised that step again. For 
example, after listing all resources and during listing entities, 
one may notice resource(s), which have been neglected in the 
previous step. In these circumstances, the list of resources is 
updated and the next steps are reviewed. These circular steps 
are taken and retaken until the designer believes that steps are 
complete and nothing has been neglected.  
Step 1. Identification of resources 
All resources are identified, no matter if they need to be 
protected or not. The resources, which do not require security 
considerations are not the main concern of a secure design, but 
they should be identified and documented. There are two types 
of resources in a system: Data and process. Data refers to a 
 
Figure 1-The process of securing an asset in a system 
collection of numbers, characters, images or other outputs from 
system to convert physical quantities into symbols. Such data is 
typically further processed by a human or input into a 
computer, stored and processed there, or transmitted (output) to 
another human or computer (possibly through a data 
connection). Pictures taken and stored on a device, contact list 
on a mobile phone are example of data. A process is an instance 
of a computer program that its instructions are being 
sequentially executed by a computer system to fulfill 
functionality or service. For instance, calculator program on a 
mobile phone is a process. 
Step 2. Security properties specification 
After listing the resources on the system, for each resource, 
we should specify the security properties the resource requires. 
In the literature various set of security properties have been 
proposed. The most accepted and generic is CIA triad: 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability [34].  
Another approach with additional security properties is 
Parkerian hexad [35]; a set of six information security 
properties proposed by Donn B. Parker. The Parkerian hexad 
adds three additional properties to the three classic security 
properties of the CIA triad: Possession or Control, 
Authenticity, and Utility.  
Possession or Control: Suppose a thief were to steal a 
sealed envelope containing a bank debit card and (foolishly) its 
personal identification number (PIN code). Even if the thief 
did not open that envelope, the victim of the theft would 
legitimately be concerned that s/he could do so at any time 
without the control of the owner. That situation illustrates a 
loss of control or possession of information but does not 
involve the breach of confidentiality. Authenticity refers to the 
veracity of the claim of origin or authorship of the information. 
Utility means usefulness. For example, suppose someone 
encrypted data on disk to prevent unauthorized access or 
undetected modifications – and then lost the decryption key: 
that would be a breach of utility. The data would be 
confidential, controlled, integral, authentic, and available, but 
they just wouldn’t be useful in that form. 
The designer selects the set of security properties 
corresponding to the system, the environment where the 
system is used and other conditions like legal issues or 
standards that enforce a security property on an asset. The 
outputs of this step are the set of assets associated with the 
security considerations determined for each asset.  
Step 3. The entities 
Anyone who involves in the life cycle of the system and 
has possibility to access asset(s) (protected or unprotected) has 
to be identified. In some cases different entities have their 
assets on the same system with different security needs and our 
design should satisfy the interest of all entities having asset(s) 
on the system. Another way of specifying entities is the 
identification of entities who are involved in the processing of 
resources. We identify the entities based on the action they do 
on the resources during the life cycle of the system. For 
example, we identify the entities that do one of actions such as 
create, edit, copy, transmit, disable, enable, and so on. 
Step 4. The life cycle of the system  
The stages of a system life cycle changes when the status 
of assets or the entities are changed. The security requirement 
of an asset may change during its life cycle. A designer should 
have prediction and vision about different stages of system life 
cycle to prevent the possible vulnerabilities in different 
situations. General life cycle of a system is typically Birth, 
Life, and Death. However each phase of life cycle is divided to 
shorter stages. For example, Birth is composed of requirement 
specification, design, implementation, testing, and so on. 
Although many systems have similar life cycle but every 
system has its own specific life cycle. It is the task of designer 
to study the life cycle of the concerned system. 
B. Defining policies 
Corresponding to the assets identified in the previous steps 
and their associated security properties, the policies are defined 
in this step. 
Step 5. Defining policies 
At this step we have a model of the system. We have a 
clear understanding of assets, their required security properties, 
the life cycle of the assets, and involved entities or 
stakeholders. Based on this model we define the security 
policies, which should be applied to the system. Security 
policy is defined for each asset separately, although we may 
group some assets and apply same policy on them. The 
security policy addresses what (asset) should be or should not 
be accessed by whom (entities) and when (life cycle). 
C. Enforcing the policies on the assets 
In the first five steps, the assets are identified and policies 
to be enforced are defined. In fact we have accomplished two 
first phases illustrated in Figure 1; identifying assets and 
defining policies. Then corresponding to this system model, 
we decide on the security requirements and protection 
mechanisms. 
 
Figure 2- The process of identifying assets in a system 
 
Step 6. Security Strategy 
We can have different strategies to tackle the security 
problem. Each strategy offers different level of security and 
certainly different amount of efforts and investment (temporal 
and monetary). In the literature different classifications are 
proposed. In [36] a four level security strategy has been 
proposed. The proposed strategy is Prevention, Tolerance, 
Removal and Forecasting. Donn Parker proposes 6 levels, 
which are Avoidance, Deterrence, Prevention, Detection, 
Recovery and Correction [37].  
Prevention is the first and the best strategy to create a 
secure system. It means preventing the occurrence or 
introduction of vulnerabilities. Mostly this is done by solutions 
and techniques during the development of the system. 
Improvement of design and development methods can result in 
good strategies for preventing security vulnerabilities. 
Prevention is the strategy of recognizing the threats and 
vulnerability of the system and implementing the 
corresponding solution to prevent an attack to occur. For 
example encryption is a prevention strategy.  
Tolerance means providing service in spite of some 
vulnerabilities or faults in the system. Different techniques can 
be applied towards tolerance such as Recovery and Self-
adaptive (self-healing) techniques.  Depending on the attack, 
different strategies can be followed. Attacks on confidentiality 
may not be recoverable although they may be prevented in 
future designs. For attacks on data integrity, we can for 
example replace the data from the backup. The usual recovery 
mechanism for attacks on availability is redundancy. For 
integrity and availability, techniques such as Roll-back can be 
applied. 
Vulnerability removal or simply removal is performed both 
during the development phase and during the operational life 
of a system. Vulnerability removal during the development 
phase of a system life-cycle consists of three steps: 
verification, diagnosis, correction. Verification is the process 
of checking whether the system adheres to given properties. If 
it does not, the other two steps follow: diagnosing the 
vulnerabilities that prevented the verification conditions from 
being fulfilled, and then performing the necessary corrections. 
After correction, the verification process should be repeated in 
order to check that vulnerability removal had no undesired 
consequences. 
Vulnerability forecasting is conducted by performing an 
evaluation of the system behavior with respect to attack 
occurrence. Evaluation has two aspects: qualitative and 
quantitative. Qualitative evaluation aims to identify, classify, 
rank attacks, or the event combinations that would lead to 
system attack. Quantitative or probabilistic evaluation aims to 
evaluate likelihood that a fault will exist or measuring the 
difficulty of an attack. 
As mentioned before, another example of security strategy 
proposes 6 levels: Avoidance, Deterrence, Prevention, 
Detection, Recovery and Correction [37].  
Avoidance is in fact risk avoidance, consists of analyzing 
the system for the features and functions that have inherently 
too high risk, e.g., sharing resources of system with other 
systems or exposing data or processes or providing insecure 
interface to other systems or users. The need for security and 
the cost of securing the system may cause these features or 
functions of the system removed to avoid many risks. Thus, 
first step is to avoid a feature of system if it causes a high risk 
for system and it is expensive to make it secure. 
Deterrence means to discourage adversary from attack by 
fear or consideration of dangerous, difficult, or unpleasant 
consequences. The fear, for example, can be the fear of 
unanticipated detection. Thus, possible sources of fear are 
good strategies for deterrence. A simple alarm or a notice on 
the device can be a deterrence technique. 
Prevention is most valued and traditional security 
safeguard. Computer security comprises mainly preventive 
measures. Prevention can be absolute, relative or partial. 
Absolute prevention means that any adversary would fail in 
any attempt to accomplish his goals. Absolute prevention is 
only a theoretical concept. A more practical prevention is to 
force potential adversary to seek other means to accomplish his 
goals. This is called relative prevention. In partial prevention, 
the action of adversary is delayed toward his goal. 
Detection will make prevention measures more effective. 
Detection alone is usually insufficient. It is the process of 
determining that an unauthorized act is impeding, is in 
progress, or has occurred recently to prevent or to limit losses. 
Detection also provides a means of recording evidence to 
determine the cause and source of a detected or potential loss. 
Password system is a prevention technique for access control 
and recording failed access attempts is a detection strategy. 
If deterrence, prevention and detection are not practical or 
are not totally effective in dealing with security vulnerability, 
then recovery and correction are essential. Recovery can be 
from a hardware failure, software bugs, operator error or data 
errors. Check-point and rollback and other methods are in this 
 
Figure 3- The process of asset protection mechanism based on defined 
policies 
Assets + Policies 
Protection Mechanisms 
Protection Strategy 
Acquired Technology 
Risk Assessment 
category. Correction should be done immediately after 
recovery. 
In summary, if a designer can avoid implementing a feature 
in the system, he must do it in the first place. Then deterrence 
discourages attacker to take an action, but if he decided to 
attack and acted toward violating security of the system, 
prevention prevents him from achieving his goals. If attacker 
was successful and prevention techniques were not effective 
enough, detection can be a method for detecting the cause, 
preventing future attacks or limiting the losses. Recovery is a 
solution to return the system to working state and correction is 
removing vulnerabilities. 
Step 7. The acquired technology 
We have the choice of various technologies for enforcing 
policies and security strategies. For example, if we want to 
secure the confidentiality of an asset, we can use symmetric or 
asymmetric encryption, or for secure storage we have different 
technologies with different level of security and of course 
different cost of investment. In this step the design team 
investigates the different available technologies corresponding 
to the system model, selected strategy, and defined policies. 
Step 8. Risk Assessment 
At this step we have a set of technologies and limited 
budget and resources to implement the system. This is the step 
to decide, which functions could be implemented. Cost-benefit 
analysis is an important component in any design method. It is 
also known as risk analysis or risk assessment. If the cost of 
protecting an asset is more than value of the asset or the cost of 
loss of asset, it is not reasonable to invest on the security of 
asset. Security in any system should be corresponding to its 
risks. However, the process to determine, which security 
controls are appropriate and cost effective is quite often a 
complex and sometimes a subjective matter. One of the prime 
functions of security risk analysis is to put this process onto a 
more objective basis. 
The approaches to risk analysis essentially break down into 
two types: quantitative and qualitative. 
A quantitative method of risk assessment proposed by 
Robert Courtney [38]. It is based on estimates of the expected 
frequency and amount of loss from each particular realized 
threat. In Courtney’s formula, the expected frequency of 
threats occurring per year P is calculated (in most cases 
approximately) by the formula  
ܲ ൌ 10ሺ௣ିସሻ 
where p is assigned one of the values in Table 1 
p=0 If particularly never 
p=1 If once in 1000 years 
p=2 If once in 100 years 
p=3 If once in ten years (taken to be 1000 days) 
p=4 If once in a year 
p=5 If once a month (10 times a year) 
p=6 If twice a week (100 times a year) 
p=7 If three times a day (1000 times a year) 
Table 1 - Frequency of threats 
For example, If frequency of threat is once in thousand 
years P = 0.001, once in a year P=1, once a month P=10. This 
numerical method of calculating frequency of threats with the 
explicit calculations of the dollar loss per event identified as V, 
yields E, the expected loss per year based on frequency and 
size of the loss, is given by 
ܧ ൌ ܲ ൈ ܸ 
In many cases it is difficult to determine meaningful 
probabilities of losses or the amount loss in absolute terms 
such as dollars in risk assessment formulas. In some cases 
there is enough recorded experience of incidents (for example, 
credit card fraud). In most cases however, data are not 
available and guessing does not produce enough consistent 
results to induce confidence. In some cases, losses are indirect, 
such as reputational losses, possibly the most important 
category, as it affects the future of the asset owner. Therefore 
quantitative method may provide useful information, but the 
resulting numbers may be deceiving because of the high 
degree of guesswork in producing the data. It also entails so 
much work; hence it should be used for only the most sensitive 
assets that involve a high potential loss. A detailed quantitative 
risk assessment can be costly and take a considerable period of 
time, but some factors like requirements imposed by law, 
regulation or pressures from external auditors, or pressures 
from competitors justify the time and investment.  
For more practical purposes, it may be more practical to 
simply rank the seriousness of threat and sensitivity of assets 
by means of qualitative grades or reasoned risk assessment. 
For example, in graded risk assessment, vulnerabilities are 
ranked in the following order: 
Highest frequency and highest loss per incident 
Moderate frequency and highest loss per incident 
Highest frequency and moderate loss per incident 
Lowest frequency and highest loss per incident 
Lowest frequency and lowest loss per incident 
 
This ranking may need minor adjustments. For example, 
threats of very high frequency and moderate loss might be 
higher than threats of moderate frequency and highest loss. 
In cases that precise risk assessment is costly and time 
consuming for the product, the designer can follow these steps:   
• Identify obvious vulnerabilities and known safeguards 
• Act on those vulnerabilities no matter what 
• Can we evaluate assets? Can we group them together? 
Can we rank them and evaluate relatively? 
• Identify threats, is the list complete? Can be grouped 
and apply to group of assets? Can be ranked based on 
frequency of occurrence? Is there level of confidence in 
the ranking? 
• Pair off the group of assets and group of threats to 
identify vulnerabilities. Identify and evaluate controls 
protecting assets from threats. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper a structural design process methodology, which 
considers security from the beginning and throughout the 
system life cycle was proposed. This methodology is easy to 
follow for designer(s) who is (are) not necessarily a security 
engineer. Comparing to other design methodologies, in this 
method, the life cycle of the system is taken into account. This 
design methodology is suitable for designing devices with 
dynamic life cycle and involving many stakeholders having 
their assets on the device.  
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